I. INTRODUCTION
S lowdowns in economic activity create periods of severe fi scal stress for subnational governments due to the existence of balanced budget rules, borrowing limitations, and limited revenue-raising options (Poterba, 1994) . As a result of the "Great Recession" for instance, The Fiscal Survey of the States (National Governor's Association and the National Association of State Budget Offi cers, 2012) reports that FY2013 is expected to be the fi rst year nominal state tax collections surpass the pre-recession levels of FY2008.
All but three states currently rely on formal "rainy day" or budget stabilization funds to dampen the fi scal stress caused by economic downturns. Given their widespread usage, studies such as Wagner and Elder (2007) , Cornia and Nelson (2003) , Sobel and Holcombe (1996) , and Navin and Navin (1997) , have used different methodologies to estimate the budget shortfall that states are likely to experience in a recession such that a rainy day fund equal to this amount could be thought of as an "optimal" fund.
H owever, state business cycles are not always perfectly synchronized. Some states may be growing at the same time that other states are contracting, which in theory suggests that states (or groups of states) may benefi t from pooling their fi scal resources because they should be able to save less in aggregate to weather recessions than the sum of what each state would need to save individually. In other words, the lack of business cycle synchronization between states creates an opportunity for diversifi cation benefi ts, which we refer to as the risk-sharing or pooling benefi t.
In this paper, we provide the fi rst estimates of the risk-sharing benefi ts to state governments. Our approach extends the Markov switching methodology employed by Wagner and Elder (2007) . Our simulation results indicate that, regardless of the time horizon or confi dence level, there are signifi cant pooling benefi ts to states over self-insuring. In fact, if a state's objective is to maintain a constant growth rate in their funds available to spend in three out of every four recessions that might occur in a given time period (or to be in the 75 th percentile), we fi nd that states can pool their resources and lower their savings by roughly 30 percent relative to the aggregate amount of savings needed when each state achieves this target individually. This nontrivial amount implies that the formation of a national rainy day fund would provide meaningful fi scal benefi ts to state governments at a lower price than self-insuring through their own rainy day funds.
Although we focus on U.S. states because of the volume of previous literature, the implications from our results are much broader because any group of governmental units could also experience risk-sharing benefi ts resulting from variation in their business cycle phases. Hence, the methodology proposed in this paper could easily be applied to national governments such as the European Union nations or county and city governments within a given state.
The following sections of the paper review the literature on rainy day funds, describe the empirical and simulation methodologies, present our results, and offer concluding remarks.
II. BACKGROUND
It is a stylized fact that fi scal policy in most national and subnational governments, particularly among Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, is countercyclical such that governments save during expansions and dissave during contractions (Lane, 2003; Fatas and Mihov, 2006) . U.S. states are no exception in that they have a long history of growing budget surpluses during expansionary periods to offset future revenue shocks and smooth expenditures over the business cycle (Wagner and Elder, 2005) .
The fi scal institutions that are present in nearly all states, which include tax and expenditure limitations (TELs), debt issuance and/or quantity restrictions, and balanced budget rules, effectively restrict access to credit markets and may limit the extent to which state policymakers can use fi scal policy to offset cyclical fl uctuations. 1 As a result, 1 Numerous studies have explored the effects of state fi scal institutions on fi scal and economic outcomes. Some recent examples include Poterba (1994) , Fatas and Mihov (2006) , Rose (2010) , and Hou and Smith (2010) .
nearly all states have institutionalized the use of savings over the past three decades via a "rainy day fund" (or budget stabilization fund) to help accumulate surplus funds during periods of growth. The primary difference between a rainy day fund (hereafter RDF) and the state's general fund is that monies are deposited and withdrawn from the general fund at the discretion of the legislature, while specifi c deposit and withdrawal rules tend to govern the use of RDFs (Wagner and Elder, 2005) . Although the use of savings involves an opportunity cost for policymakers, RDFs provide policymakers with a tool that can institutionalize countercyclical fi scal policy and may also solve time inconsistency problems that can arise if policymakers are myopic.
Research exploring RDFs has generally found that states with stringent deposit and withdrawal rules attached to their funds experience the greatest fi scal benefi ts. For instance, Hou and Duncombe (2008) , Wagner and Elder (2005) , Wagner (2004) , Knight and Levinson (1999) , and Sobel and Holcombe (1996) fi nd that states with rule-bound rainy day funds save more, experience less fi scal stress during downturns, have signifi cantly lower borrowing costs, and have smoother government expenditures over the business cycle relative to states who govern RDF deposits and withdrawals by legislative discretion.
Theoretically, it is possible for policymakers to use any savings instrument, such as a formal RDF, a general fund, or a combination of multiple funds, to achieve a desired fi scal outcome. However, the literature has opted to address the issue of the quantity of savings required to offset a fi scal shock in terms of an "optimal" rainy day fund because, in practice, states with properly structured RDFs enjoy greater fi scal benefi ts than states with improperly structured funds or with no funds at all. In other words, we follow the standard practice of discussing the savings that a state requires to offset a revenue shock as their "optimal" RDF balance, even though policymakers could achieve a target savings amount using a variety of mechanisms.
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Early studies of states' optimal savings, such as Pollock and Suyderhoud (1986) , Sobel and Holcombe (1996) , and Navin and Navin (1994) , utilized a linear trend approach and generated a point-estimate savings amount that was equal to the cumulative deviation from trend. For instance, Pollock and Suyderhoud (1986) and Navin and Navin (1997) fi t a linear trend through a state's (observed) revenue and conclude that savings equal to 11 percent and 13 percent, respectively, of the budget would be suffi cient to maintain trend revenue during a downturn. Similarly, Sobel and Holcombe (1996) sum the cumulative shortfalls in spending and revenue from their respective linear trends and estimate that a typical state would have needed savings equal to 30 percent of spending in order to maintain trend expenditures and revenues during the 1990-1991 downturn.
2 Consistent with previous studies, we also assume that policymakers desire to smooth the funds available to spend over the business cycle, which we defi ne as their actual revenue collections net of contributions to, or withdrawals from, the rainy day fund. This is a reasonable assumption for several reasons. First, the mere presence of RDFs suggests that policymakers have a desire to smooth something over the business cycle. Next, there are political consequences and institutional constraints in most states that limit the ability of policymakers to borrow or to change spending and taxes. Finally, if government spending and private consumption are separable, a representative consumer will prefer smooth government expenditures in a standard intertemporal utility maximization framework.
Since economic cycles are not predictable, policymakers may fi nd it more valuable to describe a state's optimal RDF balance in terms of a distribution of likely outcomes. Two studies, Cornia and Nelson (2003) and Wagner and Elder (2007) , adopt different methodologies to model the distribution of shortfalls states are likely to face. Cornia and Nelson (2003) model the distribution of budget defi cits in Utah using a value-atrisk approach and estimate that there is a 95 percent chance that Utah's defi cit will be no worse than $135 million in a single fi scal year. In contrast, Wagner and Elder (2007) model each state's economic cycle using Hamilton's (1989) Markov switching model, which assumes that a state's expansions and contractions are generated from two (potentially) distinct normal distributions. The Markov switching model produces estimates of the mean growth rate in expansions and contractions, as well as the probability that a given expansion/contraction continues into the next period, conditional on the current phase of the state's economy. Using these parameter estimates, Wagner and Elder (2007) construct 360,000 empirical distributions for each state and the probability that each specifi c expansion-contraction combination occurs. This allows one to not only estimate the savings amount required to cover a specifi c percentage of shortfalls, but also permits the calculation of savings rates, which is the fraction of revenue states need to save during each expansion period in order to be X percent certain they will be able to cover the next downturn (from the perspective of maintaining revenue). Wagner and Elder (2007) estimate that the median state could weather a typical (50 th percentile) recession with savings equal to 13 percent of their revenue. However, in order to be 90 percent certain they would be able to weather any given downturn, the same median state would require savings equal to 35 percent of their revenue.
Although bond rating agencies recommend that states maintain rainy day fund balances equal to 5 percent of revenue, this is a fi gure that is very rarely reached in practice. When one considers that the distributional studies by Cornia and Nelson (2003) and Wagner and Elder (2007) imply that a state should save nearly three times the "recommended amount" to offset an average downturn, it seems virtually certain that no individual state will be able to reach the extraordinary level of savings required to fully self-insure. Thus, the risk-sharing benefi ts of a national RDF -if they are large enough -could signifi cantly boost the fi scal health of states and enhance their ability to mitigate future slowdowns.
While this paper provides the fi rst estimates of the potential risk-sharing benefi ts of a national rainy day fund, Mattoon (2003) fi rst proposed the notion of such a fund in the aftermath of the 2001 recession. Mattoon argued that a national RDF could be based on the unemployment insurance compensation trust fund model, with each state amassing a minimum fund balance of 15 percent of last year's expenditures. Such a model, if adopted, would undoubtedly improve state fi scal health because each state would be required to save to avoid penalties. The benefi t of Mattoon's (2003) proposal is that it essentially links states together into a national rule-bound rainy day fund, thereby increasing the likelihood that states follow the rules. Unless state business cycles are perfectly correlated, requiring every state to accumulate the same level of savings should provide some risk-sharing benefi t. However, a constant savings rate structure may not yield the maximum pooling benefi ts because such a strategy does not fully capitalize on the unique cyclical characteristics of each state's economy. Our objective in this paper is to investigate if the variation in state business cycles is suffi cient that contributions that vary by state would provide enhanced fi scal benefi ts at a lower cost.
III. MARKOV SWITCHING METHODOLOGY AND PARAMETER ESTIMATES
Our empirical methodology follows Owyang, Piger, and Wall (2005) and Wagner and Elder (2007) by modeling state business cycle phases as being generated from a simple two-regime, Markov switching model. While Markov switching models have been extensively applied to model the business cycle phases of aggregate economic data since the seminal work of Hamilton (1989) , Owyang, Piger, and Wall (2005) were the fi rst to apply the model to subnational governments. Using Crone and ClaytonMatthews's (2005) monthly coincident index as the measure of state-level economic activity, Owyang, Piger, and Wall (2005) fi nd that states "differ signifi cantly" in the timing of their regime changes between periods of expansion and contraction. 4 This indicates substantial differences in the degree to which individual state business cycle phases are synchronized with the national economy, which suggests that states should be able to reduce their aggregate savings over the business cycle by pooling their resources.
We update Owyang, Piger, and Wall's (2005) approach by applying the Markov switching model to each state's monthly coincident index using the most recent data available (1979:09-2012:03) . Each state's coincident index is the (estimated) unobserved component that is shared by four state-level variables that are directly observed -nonfarm payroll employment, average hours worked in manufacturing, the unemployment rate, and wage and salary disbursements defl ated by the consumer price index. As Crone and Clayton-Matthews (2005) note, the index may be viewed as an estimate of the latent underlying condition of each state's economy.
If we express the index growth rate in month t for any individual state as y˙t, then the two-regime Markov switching model may be expressed as
where μ denotes the mean growth rate and ε t is the zero-mean innovation at time t, which is assumed to be normally distributed with variance σ ε 2 . The growth rate in (1) switches exogenously between two regimes and the switches are governed by an unobserved regime variable, S t = {0,1}. When S t = 0, which we refer to as the low-growth regime, ŷ t is assumed to follow a stationary AR(0) process and to have been generated from a normal distribution with a mean of μ 0 and a variance of σ ε 2 . In contrast, when S t switches to the high-growth regime (which occurs when S t changes from 0 to 1), ŷ t follows a stationary AR(0) process and is assumed to have been generated from a normal distribution with a mean equal to μ 0 + μ 1 and a variance equal to σ ε 2 . In other words, the data generating process for ŷ t is assumed to be mixture of two normal distributions having the same variance but potentially different means, with one normal distribution describing the behavior of expansions and the other distribution describing the behavior of contractions.
Despite the fact that the regime variable (S t ) is not directly observed, it can be estimated by assuming that it follows a fi rst-order, two-state Markov chain with the following transition matrix:
where P ij is the transition probability of S t = i given that S t-1 = j. Hence, P LL is the probability that economic activity is in the low-growth regime in period t conditional on having been in the low-growth regime in period t -1. We estimate (1) and (2) using Kim and Nelson's (1998) Bayesian Gibbs-sampling approach for Markov switching models. Their approach, which is very carefully detailed in Kim and Nelson (1999) , models the parameters (μ 0 , μ 1 , P HH , P LL , σ ε 2 ) and unobserved regime variable (S t ) as unknown random variables that can be evaluated from sampling from the appropriate conditional posterior distributions. 5 We apply the model to all 50 states and the United States and report the parameter estimates, which are the means of the posterior distributions, in Appendix Table A1 .
Since our interest is in using the parameter values and Owyang, Piger, and Wall (2005) discuss their estimates and the synchronization with the nation in great detail, we will only briefl y highlight the Markov switching results.
The estimates in Appendix Table A1 show each state's estimated expansion growth rate, g i,H (= μ i,0 + μ i,1 ), estimated contraction growth rate, g i,L (= μ i,0 ) and the estimated probabilities of high growth/low growth next period conditional on high growth/low growth this period (P HH /P LL ). While the mean monthly expansion and contraction growth rates across states are 0.344 percent and -0.305 percent, expansion growth rates vary from 0.166 to 0.564 percent and contraction growth rates vary from -1.208 to -0.010 percent. For the United States as a whole, our estimated (monthly) expansion and contraction growth rates are 0.271 and -0.047 percent, respectively. For the mean state, the estimates imply an annual expansion growth rate of approximately 4.2 percent and an annual contraction growth rate of nearly -3.6 percent.
Conditional on growing last period, our estimates indicate that the mean state has a 0.982 probability of growing this period. Conditional on contracting last period, our estimates indicate that the mean state has a 0.934 probability of contracting this period. Since, as Hamilton (1994) shows, the expected length of each regime j may be computed as
for j = H,L, our estimates indicate that the expected duration of an expansion and contraction for the mean state are 54.4 months and 15.1 months, respectively. The expected expansion and contraction length for the United States as a whole is estimated to be 49.7 and 15.7 months, respectively. Hence, the mean U.S. state experiences slightly longer expansions and slightly shorter contractions than the aggregate economy.
Finally, we report a concordance measure for each state in Appendix Table A1 . This measure is adopted from Owyang, Piger, and Wall (2005) and is the percentage of time each state's economy shares the same business cycle regime with the national economy. If T is the number of time periods and Ŝ H and Ŝ US denote the estimated (smoothed) probability that state i and the United States are in regime 1 (a high growth regime) at time t, then state i's concordance with the United States is given by
As the concordances show, state regimes are estimated to be "in synch" with the national economy an average of 83.6 percent of the time. However, the estimates range from a high concordance of 96.2 percent in North Carolina to a low concordance of 57.4 percent in Hawaii. Moreover, while our estimates indicate that 10 states share the same business cycle phase with the nation at least 90 percent of the time, we also fi nd that seven states are synched with the nation less than 75 percent of the time. Following the standard practice of assuming that an estimated smoothed probability of 0.5 or higher indicates an expansion (and anything less a contraction), the mean state is found to be in a high-growth regime 77 percent of the time and in a low-growth regime the remaining 23 percent of the time.
IV. POOLING METHODOLOGY
The lack of business cycle synchronization implies that states may be able to form a pool of savings (or a national rainy day fund) from which they could draw during economic downturns that would be smaller than the sum of each state's individual rainy day fund. This section of the paper presents a simple pooling example and outlines our simulation methods.
While our methodology is based on the approach of Wagner and Elder (2007) , it differs along at least one distinguishing dimension. Wagner and Elder estimated how much each state would need to accumulate to weather a single economic downturn. In this paper, we estimate how much states would need to save (individually and jointly) over a fi xed period of time such as one, two, fi ve, and 10 years. In other words, Wagner and Elder (2007) explored a single cycle with an uncertain period of time, whereas we investigate a known period of time with an uncertain number of cycles. Examining a single cycle, as opposed to a specifi c time period, is not very meaningful in the current setting because each state has different transition probabilities. This means that each state has a different probability distribution describing possible cycle durations, and states' business cycles most likely will not be synchronized. Therefore, we cannot look at a single cycle because all the states will have different probabilities of cycles lasting various lengths. A much more intuitive approach is to study the potential pooling benefi ts over a fi xed period of time, k.
A necessary component of our methodology is to repetitively simulate the k-period sequence of high-and low-growth regimes for each state, which determines the revenue sequence for each of the states. Ignoring for the moment the methodology of generating the high-and low-growth regime sequences, and hence the simulated revenue sequences, the average, or trend-growth rate is calculated as the geometric mean based on the simulated data.
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Assuming the government would like to increase the funds available to spend at a constant rate over a given time period, the geometric mean describes the growth rate of the path of revenue such that actual revenue and trend revenue are initially equal as well as being equal the last period. The gap between the actual path of revenue for an individual state and its trend is defi ned to be the "balance." If the actual path is above trend, then there is said to be a positive balance, and if the actual path is below the trend, then there is a negative balance or a shortfall. We use the term "revenue" to describe the actual funds collected from various taxes and fees in a given period, whereas we use the term "operating budget" to refer to the government's trend revenues, which are the funds available to spend in a given period and are equal to the government's revenues net of any contributions to or withdrawals from the rainy day fund.
Consider the following example, assuming there are only two states and a time horizon of 10 periods. Assume that State A has a high-growth regime growth rate of 8 percent (so μ 1,H = 0.08) and low-growth regime growth rate of -4 percent (so μ 1,L = -0.04).
Analogously, the growth rates for State B are μ 2,H = 0.085 and μ 2,L = -0.035. If State A has a realized sequence of HLHHHHHHHL (where H represents a "high" growth/ expansion regime and L represents a "low" growth/contraction regime), then the actual revenue for State A is shown in the second column of Table 1 below (with period 0 revenue normalized to 1). Likewise, if State B has a realized sequence of HHHHHLHHHH, then their actual revenue sequence is shown in column four of the table below. There should be some pooling benefi t since these two states are not perfectly correlated. Based on the realized sequence for State A, the average growth rate for State A is 5.5 percent and the average growth rate for State B is 7.2 percent. The trends (or operating budget) for State A and State B are reported in columns 3 and 5 in Table 1 , which are based on each state's average growth over the 10-period time horizon.
The period-by-period budget balances are computed by subtracting the trend/operating budget from actual revenues for each period (and are shown in columns 6 and 7 of Table  1 ). Based on Table 1 above, State A is above its trend/operating budget in the fi rst period by 0.025, but since the second period is a low-growth period, State A is below trend/ operating budget in period 2 by 0.076. Even though the next 7 periods are high growth periods for State A, State A does not get back to its trend/operating budget until the fi fth period, experiencing budgetary shortfalls for periods 2, 3, and 4. By contrast, State B is above trend/operating budget in each of its fi rst 5 periods before experiencing its fi rst low-growth period, which sends State B below its trend/operating budget in period 6. Again, like State A, even though State B fi nishes the 10-period sample with four high growth periods, State B experiences budgetary shortfalls for periods 6, 7, 8, and 9. Assume that a state wishes to increase its funds available to spend at a constant rate and accumulate enough savings prior to the 10-period time horizon so that it can withdraw from its accumulated savings in the event of a budget shortfall and fi nish the time horizon with zero savings. This amount is equal to the sum of the budget defi cits, which is -0.159 for State A and -0.188 for State B. Therefore, in this particular realization for State A, if it had accumulated savings of 0.159, then it would have had suffi cient savings to withdraw during periods 2, 3, and 4 when it is below trend/operating budget and end the 10-year period with zero savings. Since State B would need to accumulate savings of 0.188 to fully self-insure, the aggregate amount of accumulated individual state savings to weather these 10 periods would be 0.347.
Alternatively, we now allow the states to pool their budget positions, which is shown in column 8 of Table 1 . In just period 2, State A has a defi cit of -0.076 and State B has a surplus of 0.027, so their pooled balance is equal to -0.049. In period 4, even though State A still has a defi cit of -0.029, this would be more than offset by State B's surplus of 0.063, which yields a pooled balance of 0.035. The pooled balance is only negative in periods 2, 3, and 6, and the sum of the negative pooled balances over the time horizon is equal to -0.095. This implies that States A and B could pool their resources and offset the 10-year time horizon with savings of 0.095 percent of revenue, which is substantially below the non-pooled necessary aggregate accumulated savings of 0.347 percent of revenue. In short, both states would be able to maintain their unique trend/operating budget over the specifi ed time horizon by saving less when their resources are pooled.
We refer to the aggregate individual savings as "AI savings" and the pooled accumulated savings as "PA savings." We report our simulation results as the percentage reduction that the pooled savings represents, relative to the aggregate individual savings. For instance, in the simple example above, the pooled savings is 0.095 and the aggregate individual savings is 0.347, implying that pooling reduces the sum of individual savings by 72.6 percent. 8
A. Data Simulation
As mentioned above, a prerequisite for calculating the effects of pooling is the generation of a revenue series for each of the 50 states. However, since the pooling benefi ts are derived from the states being in different phases of their business cycles, the data generation process requires us to simulate the probability that each state (and the United States) is in an expansion regime/contraction regime in every time period. This is accomplished in a sequence of steps. Our approach begins by drawing an initial regime for the national economy. The initial regime of the national economy is based on the unconditional probabilities of the national economy being in a high-or lowgrowth regime, P H and P L respectively. The unconditional probabilities are based on the conditional probabilities (which are the estimated Markov switching parameters), P HH and P LL for the national economy; these estimates are 0.9799 and 0.9364 respectively. The unconditional probabilities are calculated as P H = (1 -P LL )/(2 -P HH -P LL ) and P L = 1 -P H (P H = 0.76 and P L = 0.24). A number is randomly drawn from a uniform distribution between zero and one, denoted U(0,1). If the number is less than 0.76, then the initial period is assumed to be a high-growth regime, otherwise it is assumed to be a low-growth regime.
Once the period 1 regime is established for the national economy, the period 1 regimes are determined for each state based on each state's concordance, γ i , with the nation and a random draw from a U(0,1) distribution. For example, since Virginia has a concordance with the nation of 0.908, if the random draw is less than 0.908, then Virginia's period 1 regime is the same as the nation's period 1 regime. This process is repeated for each state until the period 1 regimes for all the states have been established. 9 We further assume that the period t + 1 regime for a specifi c state depends on that state's period t regime as well as the period t regime of a set of other neighboring states. For example, Ohio's period 2 regime may depend on Ohio's period 1 regime as well as the period 1 regimes of Michigan and Indiana. For explanatory purposes, assume that Ohio's period t + 1 regime depends on Ohio's period t regime as well as the period t regime of Michigan and Indiana. If all three states were in a high-growth regime (denoted S OH = 1, S MI = 1, S IN = 1) in period 1, then we refer to the matrix of smoothed probabilities to count how many times all three were estimated to be in a high-growth regime in the same period. Then, conditioning on those periods when all three states were in a high-growth regime, we count how many times Ohio was estimated to be in a high-growth regime in the subsequent period. If, for example, all three states were in a high-growth regime 10 times and of those 10 times, Ohio was in a high-growth regime in the following period in eight of those instances, then we assume that there is an 80 percent chance that Ohio will be in a high-growth regime in the period following a situation in which all three states were in a high-growth regime in the previous period; Ohio's period 2 regime is assigned based on this probability. A number is randomly drawn from a U(0,1) distribution. If the number is less than 0.80, then Ohio's second period is a high-growth regime, otherwise it is assumed to be in a low-growth regime. If alternatively, Ohio's period 1 regime was a low-growth regime while Michigan was in a low-growth regime, and Indiana was in a high-growth regime (denoted S OH = 0, S MI = 0, S IN = 1), then we count the number of times Ohio was in a high growth regime in the subsequent period and the ratio of these is the probability that Ohio is in a highgrowth regime in period t + 1 given S OH = 0, S MI = 0, S IN = 1 in period t. This process is repeated for each state to establish the period 2 regimes for all the states. Then this process is repeated for k periods. This establishes a k-period sequence of high and lowgrowth regimes for each state. If a particular sequence is not found in the smoothed probabilities, then the default is the state's own history. 10 Furthermore, we also assume that each individual state's economy is characterized by a state-specifi c high-growth rate of μ i,H and a low-growth rate of μ i,L , which are given by the Markov switching parameter estimates in Appendix Table 1 . Revenue collected by each state is assumed to share the identical high-and low-growth characteristics as the state's economy, so by simulating each state's economy we are effectively simulating a sequence for each state's period-by-period revenue stream.
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Finally, because states are different sizes in terms of their budgets, we scale each state accordingly and a sequence of revenue collections is generated for each state based on that state's periodby-period growth rates.
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In other words, if a state has a 5 period sequence of HHLLH, a high-growth regime growth rate of 5 percent, a low-growth regime growth rate of -3 percent, and the state has a size of 4 (meaning that its revenues are four times larger than the revenues of the smallest state), then the revenue sequence for that state over the 5 periods would be equal to 420.0, 441.0, 427.7, 414.9, and 435.6 respectively. 13 There are various methods to establish which set of states matters for each state (as in the example above, Michigan and Indiana mattered for Ohio). One method is to consider states that border a specifi c state. Some states do not border any other states (AK and HI), whereas other states border many (TN, MO, CO). As the number of states that "matter" for a specifi c state increases, so too does the number of possible sequences. If m additional states are considered (in the example above, m = 2 because 10 For example, if we were considering fi ve other states and we were looking for S OH = 0, S MI = 0, S IN = 1, S PA = 1, S WV = 0, S KY = 1, but that specifi c combination did not appear in the history of the estimated smoothed probabilities, then we simply used Ohio's own history to calculate the probability of transitioning from a 0 (which is the regime Ohio is in) to another 0 (or 1). Because there are almost 400 periods in the dataset, not surprisingly, the transition probabilities estimated from the switching regression are very close to those that could be estimated directly based on the smoothed probabilities. 11 The use of actual revenue data is too problematic because they are very low frequency (typically annual) and it is impossible to completely control for the effects of policy rate and base changes. Our estimates implicitly assume that each state's overall revenue portfolio has an elasticity of unity with respect to the state's coincident index (our measure of the state's economy). It is trivial to allow actual revenues to be more or less volatile than the state's economy. If, for example, a state's revenues were 10 percent more volatile than the state's economy (coincident index), then our estimates could simply be multiplied by 1.1. 12 The smallest state, South Dakota, is normalized to one and the "size" of other states is based on the average revenue during our sample period. Additionally, we determined "size" based on state government revenue in just 2009 (instead of the average over the whole sample), but there was very little difference in these two metrics. 13 Period 0 revenue is normalized to be the size of the state times 100.
we were considering Michigan's and Indiana's previous regimes, as well as Ohio's previous regime, when determining Ohio's current regime), and a state has more than m bordering states, then we take the m bordering states with the largest border. We restrict m to be less than 6 because there are 2 m+1 combinations of possible sets of regimes, and with 393 time periods, the likelihood of all of the combinations occurring in the data decreases as m increases. We vary m from 2 to 6 to examine the sensitivity of the simulations. If a particular state has fewer than m bordering states, then all the bordering states are considered.
As an alternative to common borders, we also consider states that "matter" to be the states that are in relative proximity to a given state. In these cases, we measure the distance between two states using the distance between the population centers in each state. If state A is assumed to be infl uenced by four other states, for instance, then we select the four states based on the closest distance to state A. We again vary m from 2 to 6 to examine the robustness of the simulations.
After randomly generating a k-period sequence for each state based on the process discussed above, we repeat the process 10,000 times and form a distribution of both non-pooled and pooled accumulated savings.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
We examine four different time periods: 12, 24, 60, and 120 months. The benefi t from pooling is reported as the percentage reduction from aggregated individual savings, which is calculated as 100*(1 -(PA savings ÷ AI savings)). Thus, if aggregate individual savings (AI) is 10 and the pooled accumulated savings (PA) is 4, the benefi t to pooling would be a 60 percent reduction in the aggregate savings required. Figures closer to 100 represent a larger benefi t of pooling, while numbers closer to 0 represent less of a risk-sharing benefi t. To further investigate the sensitivity of our results, we compare the AI savings to the PA savings at the 50 th , 75 th , and 90 th percentiles. Examining various points along the estimated distributions means that we do not have to make rigid assumptions about the actual objective function(s) of state policymakers. If, for example, a policymaker would like to maintain a constant growth rate in a state's budget on average over a given time period, then the 50 th percentile estimates would be appropriate. If her objective is instead to have a constant operating budget growth rate in three out of every four recessions that might occur in a given time period, then the 75 th percentile estimates are relevant. However, as mentioned above, our simulation results do not show the level of savings required, rather we report the percentage benefi t from risk-sharing.
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The results of our simulations are presented below in Table 2 . The columns under the major heading "Shortest Distances" show the results that are based on the distances 14 Since we focus on a fi xed period time in the simulations rather than a single business cycle as did Wagner and Elder (2007) or Cornia and Nelson (2003) , our estimates are not strictly comparable to previous studies.
Table 2
Simulation Results Adjusting for Actual State Sizes between population centers for each state. The columns under the major heading "Longest Borders" contain the results in which the simulated data for each state are infl uenced by the regimes of the state's common-border neighbors.
In general, we fi nd that the benefi ts to pooling are very robust regardless of the number of states we consider when simulating the data or regardless of whether we use border distances or distances between population centers in deciding how neighboring states matter. The results should be interpreted as follows: suppose we are examining a time horizon of one year (N=12) and the data are simulated using two additional states that are closest in terms of distance between population centers. If we are looking at a typical recession, for the 50 th percentile, then the relevant fi gure in Table 2 is 76.9, which means that pooling fi scal resources reduces the total amount that states need to save by at least 76.9 percent when compared to aggregate individual savings. If we use three additional states (again, using the three closest states with respect to distances between population centers) then, at the 50 th percentile, the pooling benefi t is estimated to be at least 74.7 percent. Finally, if each state is assumed to be infl uenced by six neighboring states (again, defi ning neighbors based on the distances between population centers), then the risk-sharing benefi t is estimated to be at least 74.2 percent.
Moreover, if we use two additional states and a time horizon of one year (N=12), the pooling benefi t is estimated to be at least 26.5 percent at the 75 th percentile. If the data are simulated using common-border neighbors instead of the shortest distance between population centers to determine which states "matter," then the results do not change in a meaningful way. For example, if we consider the two states with the longest borders with each particular state (for N=12), then the pooling results in a reduction in savings of at least 76.8 percent at the 50 th percentile (compared to 76.9 percent when using two states with the shortest distance between population centers).
In general, the results in Table 2 show that risk-sharing benefi ts are greatest at the 50 th percentile and diminish noticeably at higher confi dence levels. For example, considering two additional states based on the distance between population centers and a time horizon of fi ve years (N=60), the pooling benefi t is at least 88.4 percent at the 50 th percentile, at least 38.3 percent at the 75 th percentile, and falls to at least 13.1 percent at the 90 th percentile. Since a higher confi dence level increases the likelihood that a very severe recession will arise, the risk-sharing benefi ts decrease because more states are likely to be in the same regime in any given period in such instances. To put it another way, the benefi ts are largest for a 50 th percentile recession because considerably fewer states will be in the same regime in any given period, which raises the pooling benefi t (recall that a "typical" recession lasts around 15 months based on the Markov switching estimates).
In addition, to test whether the benefi ts are being driven by large states, we perform additional simulations where all the states are assumed to be the same size. Since the largest state (California) is fi fty times larger than the smallest state (South Dakota) in terms of actual revenue collections, it is possible that the pooling benefi ts in Table 2 are the result of low concordances between a small number of very large states (Florida, Texas, New York, etc.) . All else equal, the larger the state, the more weight that state is given when calculating the pooled and individual savings. Including a state such as Table 3 Simulation Results Forcing All States To Be The Same Size California has the same effect as including 50 states the size of South Dakota, all of which are perfectly correlated.
Assuming that all states are equally sized, we fi nd the pooling benefi ts to actually be larger because the diversifi cation is greater. These results are shown below in Table 3 . However, because the results in Table 3 are only slightly larger than the corresponding pooled benefi ts in Table 2 , this clearly indicates that the pooling benefi ts shown in Table  2 are not being driven by the concordances between a subset of large states.
Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to fully address some of the practical issues that might arise in the formation of a national rainy day fund, the magnitude of the risk-sharing benefi ts suggests that this will be a fruitful area of future research. We also believe that interstate compacts, which have a long history in the U.S. arising from interstate boundary agreements, could easily serve as a viable institutional arrangement within which a voluntary national rainy day fund could be formed. Interstate compacts are binding legal contracts between two or more states that may deal with virtually any topic or issue. Voit, Vickers, and Gavenonis (2003) show that several hundred compacts are already in place, ranging from simple boundary agreements to agreements to share resources in the event of common disasters such as forest fi res. Compact rules can be as specifi c or general as states wish, even going so far as to specify damages, litigation, or arbitration in the event of a contract breach (Voit, Vickers, and Gavenonis, 2003) . Hence, an established legal framework is already in place for states to voluntarily form an "interstate rainy day fund compact" that could easily stipulate the deposit and withdrawal mechanisms based on the business cycle characteristics of each state's economy. The federal government could even incentivize states to join by agreeing to pay each state's initiation fee or something similar.
One additional concern with a national rainy day fund is the moral hazard issue that might arise if states behave "badly" because there is a mechanism in place to bail them out. This issue could be eliminated if the trigger mechanism to determine whether states pay into the fund or receive a payment from the fund is based on the state's monthly coincident index, which is effectively outside of the control of the state's decision-makers. The index is the unobserved common component of nonfarm payroll employment, average hours worked in manufacturing, the unemployment rate, and wage and salary disbursements. The objective of the fund should be to hedge against unforeseeable economic downturns rather than inept fi scal management. Thus, we see no reason why any moral hazard issues would arise when using the coincident index as the basis to assess economic health.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have shown that the benefi ts from pooling fi scal resources can substantially reduce the total amount that states would need to save to weather a fi scal crisis caused by an economic contraction. Moreover, the benefi ts are very robust to several data simulation methods and to the time horizon examined and are not driven by the presence of a few large states. A national rainy day fund is therefore an economically viable mechanism to improve the fi scal health of state governments. Interstate compacts appear to provide the necessary legal framework to allow a national rainy day fund to be formed.
While this paper was limited to assessing whether meaningful pooling benefi ts do in fact exist, there are several natural extensions to this line of research. First, appropriate trigger mechanisms for each state's deposits and withdrawals must be determined. The triggers should be straightforward to construct using the simulated distribution of each state's revenue cycle. Second, since it may be easier in practice to coordinate smaller groups of states, it would be interesting to compare the risk-sharing benefi ts from smaller groups of states with the pooling benefi ts from the group of all 50 states. Ideally, the smaller groups of states would be of similar size and have low concordances with each other. Finally, it may also be interesting to investigate other levels of governments, such as the local governments within a state or the Euro countries, to determine the extent to which risk-sharing benefi ts still exist. 
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